Respecting the deal: how to manage co-opetitive actors in open innovation

Platforms like E-bay allow product seekers and providers to meet and exchange goods. On the same way in open innovation, as defined by Chesbrough, an enterprise can collect ideas from outside the company. But on E-bay, the seeker can return the product if it does not correspond to the expectations, since E-bay is the third-party actor in charge of assuring that the agreement between seekers and providers will be respected. So who does provide the same service for what concerns open innovation, where specifications might not fully defined? In this paper we shall describe the business model of an organizational structure to support the elicitation and respect of agreements between actors, who have conflicting interests but that gain from cooperating together. The concepts of the model will be illustrated to derive a set of propositions and a simple example will illustrate one of its possible instantiations. The description of our first evaluation phase shall find place at the end

The Intrinsic Quantum Nature of Nash Equilibrium Mixtures

Every undergraduate textbook in game theory has a chapter discussing the difficulty to interpret the mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Unlike the usual suggested interpretations made in those textbooks, here we prove that these randomised strategies neither imply that players use some coin flips to make their decisions, nor that the mixtures represent the uncertainty of each player about the others' actions.Instead, the paper demonstrates a fundamental connection between the Nash equilibrium 'randomised' or 'mixed' strategies of classical game theory and the pure quantum states of quantum theory in physics. This link has some key consequences for the meaning of randomised strategies:In the main theorem, I prove that in every mixed Nash equilibrium, each player state of knowledge about his/her own future rational choices is represented by a pure quantum state. This indicates that prior making his/her actual choice, each player must be in a quantum superposition over her/his possible rational choices (in the support of his probability measure). This result notably permits to show that the famous 'indifference condition' that must be satisfied by each player in an equilibrium is actually the condition that ensures each player is in a 'rational epistemic state of ignorance' about her/his own future choice of an action

Co-opetition models for governing professional football

In recent years, models for co-creating value in a business-to-business context have often been examined with the aim of studying the strategies implemented by and among organisations for competitive and co-operative purposes. The traditional concepts of competition and co-operation between businesses have now evolved, both in terms of the sector in which the businesses operate and in terms of the type of goods they produce. Many researchers have, in recent times, investigated the determinants that can influence the way in which the model of co-opetition can be applied to the football world. Research interest lies in the particular features of what makes a good football. In this paper, the aim is to conduct an analysis of the rules governing the “football system”, while also looking at the determinants of the demand function within football entertainment. This entails applying to football match management the co-opetition model, a recognised model that combines competition and co-operation with the view of creating and distributing value. It can, therefore, be said that, for a spectator, watching sport is an experience of high suspense, and this suspense, in turn, depends upon the degree of uncertainty in the outcome. It follows that the rules ensuring that both these elements can be satisfied are a fertile ground for co-operation between clubs, as it is in the interest of all stakeholders to offer increasingly more attractive football, in comparison with other competing products. Our end purpose is to understand how co-opetition can be achieved within professional football

Value Creation from Big Data: Looking Inside the Black Box

The advent of big data is fundamentally changing the business landscape. We open the ‘black box’ of the firm to explore how firms transform big data in order to create value and why firms differ in their abilities to create value from big data. Grounded in detailed evidence from China, the world’s largest digital market, where many firms actively engage in value creation activities from big data, we identify several novel features. We find that it is not the data itself, or individual data scientists, that generate value creation opportunities. Rather, value creation occurs through the process of data management, where managers are able to democratize, contextualize, experiment and execute data insights in a timely manner. We add richness to current theory by developing a conceptual framework of value creation from big data. We also identify avenues for future research and implications for practicing managers